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BALANCING SECURITY AND GROWTH: DEFINING
NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN CHINA
Eric Jensen†
Abstract: One of the most recent steps in China’s slow march towards
liberalization of foreign investment is the introduction of the 2006 Provisions on
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“2006 M&A Provisions”).
Article 12 of this law provides new procedures for review and approval of foreign
investment in China. China’s national security review of foreign direct investment has
the same motivations as the United States’ Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) review, but it is much murkier and less efficient. CFIUS is
governed by numerous statutory and regulatory guidelines. China should integrate some
of the CFIUS statutes and regulations, which allow the United States to address new
threats to national security without unreasonably burdening foreign investment, into its
national security review process. China should also draw on standards contained in other
parts of the 2006 M&A Provisions to improve the workability of national security review
under Article 12. These changes would help ensure that foreign investors will be willing
to continue providing the capital that has helped drive China’s economic transformation,
while safeguarding China’s essential national security interests.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A steep decline in foreign investment in developing economies was
one of the major consequences of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.1
Projections indicate that global investment in emerging markets will decline
31 percent in 2009.2 China has not been exempted from this decline in
foreign investment. The decline in foreign investment in China combined
with the other effects of the global economic slowdown caused the closing
of tens of thousands of factories in China.3 As a result, labor protests broke
out, leading to a number of clashes between workers and riot police.4 Plant
closings and labor unrest have been most prevalent in the coastal regions of

† Juris Doctor expected 2010, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Dongsheng Zang and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, especially
Amanda Maus Stephen, Caitlin Morray, Megan Winder, and Tobias Damm-Luhr.
1
Patricia Lui, Emerging Markets Face $180 Billion Investment Decline, BLOOMBERG.COM. Jan. 20,
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=apJ57WoinRr8&refer=latin_america.
2
Id.
3
Edward Wong, Factories Shut, China Workers Are Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008 at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/world/asia/14china.html.
4
Id.
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China.5 Previously, these areas had seen the bulk of foreign investment in
China due to tax and regulatory advantages.6
Since 1978, Chinese foreign direct investment policies have been
gradually liberalized.7 However, investors fear that developing economies,
including China, are “becom[ing] increasingly protectionist under the guise
of a national security review.”8 Article 12 of China’s 2006 Provisions on
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“2006 M&A
Provisions”)9 allows such review. Under Article 12, China’s Ministry of
Commerce has the authority to subject foreign investment to a national
security screening that, because of its vague and as-yet-undefined process
and lack of investor protections, may drive foreign investment away from
China.
The United States also screens foreign investment for national security
concerns. In the United States, the interagency Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) performs national security
reviews of foreign investments.10 The Chinese and American systems share
the common goal of protecting national security without acting as an
unnecessary barrier to foreign investment. China’s 2006 M&A Provisions
were enacted in part because of a belief that China needed a national security
review process similar to the United States.11 However, the systems are in
different stages of procedural development. CIFUS has existed since 197512
and its review is governed by clear statutory and regulatory rules including
timelines, express review criteria, and “safe harbor” protections for
investors.13 China’s 2006 M&A Provisions lack any such provisions.
5

Id.
Id.
7
ZULIU HU & MOHSIN S. KHAN, INT’L MONETARY FUND, WHY IS CHINA GROWING SO FAST, 8
ECONOMIC
ISSUES
1
(1997)
available
at
http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/ISSUES8/INDEX.HTM. For the purposes of this comment,
“liberal” trade policies are defined as “policies that allow the unrestricted flow of goods and services.”
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Case for Open Trade,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
8
Jessica Holzer, National Security Chill on Takeovers, FORBES.COM, Dec. 6, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/21/cfius-outlook-washington-biz-wash-cx_jh_1222cfius.html
(internal
quotations omitted) (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
9
Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006), art. 12, translated in
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/200610/20061003434565.html (P.R.C.)
(last visited Nov. 20, 2009) [hereinafter 2006 M&A Provisions].
10
See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2007).
11
See Destiny Duron Deas, The Costs of Perceived Hypocrisy: The Impact of U.S. Treatment of
Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises, 57 DUKE L.J. 1795, 1795 (2008).
12
See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1975).
13
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170.
6
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Because China has the same dual goals of encouraging foreign investment
and protecting national security, the provisions guiding CFIUS should serve
as a blueprint for China in making changes to its review procedures.
In addition to the United States CFIUS rules, China should also look
to other articles in the 2006 M&A Provisions for guidance in reforming
Article 12. The 2006 M&A Provisions provide rules for normal “nonnational-security” review, including rules governing which transactions must
be submitted for review to Chinese officials14 and explicit timelines for
review.15 Because the rules for “non-national-security” review provide
increased investor confidence and protection, they should also be integrated
into China’s national security review regime.
This Comment examines the history and structure of national security
review in the United States and China and suggests changes to China’s
national security review process to clarify its scope, procedures, and effects.
Part II reviews the history and structure of foreign direct investment in
China and the history of national security review of foreign direct
investment in the United States. Part III examines some of the shortfalls of
national security review under Article 12. Part IV recommends changes and
additions to China’s national security review of foreign direct investment.
II.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY
CONCERNS IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE PROMPTED THE
NEED FOR REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

The respective approaches to national security review of foreign
investment in the United States and China have been greatly shaped by their
historical attitudes towards and experience with such investment. China’s
only recent embrace of foreign direct investment as well as lingering
mistrust of foreign investors has informed its recent adoption of opaque
national security review procedures. The United States, in contrast, has a
longer history of allowing foreign investment and more experience with
national security screening. This experience has shaped the United States’
CFIUS procedures while placing emphasis not strictly on national security,
but also on maintaining an open investment policy.

14
15

2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9, art. 21, 22, 23, 32, 42, 44.
Id. art. 25.
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Article 12 of the 2006 M&A Provisions Bucks China’s Trend of Market
Liberalization

China’s embrace of foreign investment and trade has helped drive its
transformation into a global economic powerhouse. “Over the past quartercentury no country has gained more from globalization than China.”16
Cumulative foreign direct investment in China, negligible before 1978,
reached nearly $100 billion in 1994.17 Similarly, annual inflows of foreign
investment increased from less than one percent of total fixed investment18
in 1979 to eighteen percent in 1994.19 In 2008 alone, China took in $92.4
billion in foreign investment.20
This foreign money has helped build factories, create jobs, link China
to international markets, and has led to important transfers of technology.21
This new advanced technology has been a boon not just for China’s
economic growth, but also its military and intelligence communities and, as
a result, national security.22 In addition to fueling macro-economic
development, China’s economic growth has also allowed hundreds of
millions of Chinese to move from subsistence living to the middle class.23
These trends are especially apparent in coastal areas where foreign investors
are given tax advantages.24 In addition, economic liberalization has boosted
exports, which rose 19 percent a year from 1981 to 1994. Strong export
growth, in turn, appears to have fueled productivity growth in domestic
industries.25 China’s move towards embracing foreign investment has not,
however, been without some difficulty. China’s past resistance to foreign
investment has helped shape its national security review procedure under
Article 12.

16

How China Sees the World, THE ECONOMIST, March 21, 2009, at 13.
HU & KHAN. supra note 7, at 5.
18
Fixed investment is investment in tangible capital goods (physical assets like machinery, land,
buildings, vehicles, etc.) or in the replacement of depreciated capital goods. See generally Robert S.
Chirinko, Business Fixed Investment Spending: Modeling Strategies, Empirical Results, and Policy
Implications, 31 J. OF ECON. LIT. 1875 (1993).
19
HU & KHAN. supra note 7, at 5.
20
China’s
FDI
Up
23.6%,
XINHAU,
Jan.
1,
2009,
available
at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/15/content_10662757.htm.
21
HU & KHAN. supra note 7, at 5.
22
Jordan Brandt, Comparing Foreign Investment in China, Post-WTO Accession, With Foreign
Investment in the United States, Post-9/11, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y. J. 285, 288 (2006).
23
How China Sees the World, supra note 16, at 13.
24
HU & KHAN. supra note 7, at 5.
25
Id.
17
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China’s Economic Growth Will Likely Stall if Foreign Direct
Investment is Thwarted.

China retained some problematic regulatory barriers to foreign
investment. Regulations that unnecessarily confuse or discourage foreign
investors may deter continued foreign investment in China.26 Today’s
economic climate has exacerbated concerns about the effect of discouraging
foreign investment. China has already suffered a 32.67 percent decline in
foreign investment in the first few months of 2009.27
Under these conditions, maintaining a confusing foreign investment
regulatory scheme could delay China’s economic recovery. The slowdown
in global investment, as well as the advantages that China has previously
gleaned from foreign investment, provide ample incentives for China to
formulate a national security review regime that promotes foreign
investment in China.
2.

Regulation of Foreign Investment in China Has Been Gradually
Liberalized, But Not Without Some Political Backlash

The modern history of foreign direct investment in China is brief.
Before 1983, Chinese law prohibited foreign investors from acquiring a
stake in Chinese companies.28 In the wake of the liberalization of the
Chinese economy that started in 1978, the Chinese government began to
relax regulation of both domestic and foreign capital investment.29 From
1983 to 2003, the central government dealt with acquisitions of domestic
companies by foreign entities on an ad hoc basis.30 In April 2003, the
Chinese government promulgated the Interim Regulations on Mergers and
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“Interim
Regulations”).31 The Interim Regulations provided little more than a vague

26
For example, lower foreign investment and reduced exports has led to the closing of tens of
thousands of factories and labor riots in some areas of China. Wong, supra note 3.
27
Foreign Investment in China Plunges in January, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 16, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-02/16/content_7480346.htm. (last visited Nov. 20, 2009)
28
Ken Davies, Senior Economist, OECD, China's FDI Policies: The OECD’s Policy Review and
Possible Next Step, 8 (Dec. 2, 2003), http://www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/china_fdi_update.pdf (last visited
Nov. 17, 2009).
29
HU & KHAN. supra note 7, at 5.
30
Davies, supra note 28, at 8.
31
Waiguo touzi zhibing goujing nei qiye zhixing guiding [Interim Regulations on Mergers and
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce,
Mar. 7, 2003, effective Apr. 12, 2003) translated in http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/200604/17/content_569271.htm (P.R.C) (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Interim Regulations].
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outline of the process for foreign corporations to acquire controlling stakes
in domestic Chinese enterprises.32
The Chinese government, motivated by a desire for international
capital and an exponentially growing economy, has welcomed foreign
investors by giving them more and more access to larger shares of Chinese
companies.33 However, in the past 15 years, the Chinese business
community has grown increasingly concerned about foreign investment.34
Many worry foreign enterprises were being given too many advantages in
the emerging market and were thus gaining “capacity and market share in
China, without adequate oversight by the central government.”35
The public battle between the Chinese Sany Corporation (“Sany”) and
American Carlyle Group (“Carlyle Group”) catalyzed this sentiment. Both
companies wished to take over China's largest construction machinery
manufacturer, Shanghai-based Xugong Construction Machinery Group
(“XCMG”)36 The Carlyle Group was the first to enter into an agreement
with XCMG on the takeover.37 After its own takeover bid was dismissed,
however, Sany launched a popular opinion protest against the proposed
Carlyle Group acquisition.38 In the face of growing public discontent, the
Ministry of Commerce suspended review of the acquisition, placing it in
bureaucratic limbo for over a year until the Carlyle Group decided to scale
back its initial investment from 85 percent to 50 percent.39 The Carlyle
Group changed its majority ownership position to secure central government
approval of the deal, something that had become less and less likely as time
dragged on.40 The Ministry of Commerce had effectively used its review
discretion to quash a politically sensitive takeover bid. This tension between
liberalizing economic policies, reacting to political pressure, and
safeguarding national security has been at the heart of China’s recent
adoption of new rules that provide for national security review of foreign
investment.
32

Id.
Peter A. Neumann & Tony Zhang, China's New Foreign-Funded M&A Provisions: Greater Legal
Protection or Legalized Protectionism?, 20 CHINA LAW & PRAC. 21, 21 (2006).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
War of Words in Company Takeover Battle, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, June 16, 2006,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/16/eng20060616_274537.html (last visited October 29, 2009).
37
Id.
38
Russell Flannery, A China That Can Say No, FORBES.COM, Sept. 18, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/global/2006/0918/096.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
39
Largest Machine Tool Manufacturer to Sell Shares, XINHUA, Nov. 29, 2006,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/29/content_5406343.htm (last visited October 29, 2009).
40
Id.
33
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China Adopts the 2006 M&A Provisions to Revise and Expand its
Review of Foreign Direct Investment

The same year the Carlyle Group's takeover was thwarted, the
Ministry of Commerce promulgated and adopted the revised 2006 M&A
Provisions.41 One scholar has suggested that the new provisions were
enacted in response to the Carlyle Group’s takeover bid and perceived
hypocrisy in the United States’ treatment of foreign investment.42
China may also have been motivated to adopt the 2006 M&A
Provisions due to its recent frustrations with the United States’ direct foreign
investment regulations. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered the
first, and only, formal divestment.43 President George H.W. Bush ordered a
Chinese company, China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation (“CATIC”), to divest any interest in MAMCO Manufacturing,
Inc. (“MAMCO”), a Seattle-based commercial aircraft manufacturer.44 “The
American public thought that CFIUS was not doing enough to thwart
attempts by foreign governments to take control of major U.S. industries.”45
CFIUS had been “closely monitor[ing] recent investment attempts in the
United States by the People's Republic of China since it [was] the last
remaining communist threat.”46 CFIUS was especially suspicious of
CATIC, which “had a reputation for disregarding foreign-export-control
laws in order to obtain sensitive Western technology.”47 This transaction led
to the Byrd Amendment, which was enacted to “tighten[] . . . the CFIUS
review process.”48
In 2005, the United States again stepped in to block a takeover by a
Chinese company. Congress intervened to prevent China National Offshore
Oil Company (“CNOOC”) from acquiring California-based Unocal.49 This

41

2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9.
See Deas, supra note 11.
43
Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investments Obligations
in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 96 (1989).
44
Id.
45
Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment After the Dubai Ports Controversy: Has the
U.S. Government Finally Figured Out How to Balance Foreign Threats to National Security Without
Alienating Foreign Companies?, 34 J. OF CORP. L. 293, 299 (2008).
46
Id.
47
Jim Mendenhall, United States: Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions Under the Exon-Florio
Amendment--The MAMCO Divestiture, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 286, 290 (1991).
48
Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining
the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 868 (2006).
49
H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005).
42
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intervention was seen as necessary in the United States,50 but was decried in
China.51
As the acquisition of Unocal by CNOOC progressed, it was met by
increased political opposition.52 Members of the U.S. Congress voiced their
objections, stating “CNOOC's proposal should be rejected on security
grounds.”53
The Unocal debate culminated with the House of
Representatives approving a non-binding resolution which stated that the
takeover would “threaten to impair the national security of the United
States” and urging President Bush to block the deal.54 On August 1,
Unocal's board of directors recommended that shareholders accept
Chevron’s offer because the CNOOC bid did not “compensate Unocal
shareholders for the ‘higher risk of the CNOOC transaction.’”55 CNOOC
subsequently withdrew of its offer and Unocal shareholders voted to approve
Chevron’s offer.56 Soon after this incident, China enacted its own version of
national security review in Article 12.57
China’s revised law now consists of sixty-one provisions, a substantial
expansion of the twenty-six provisions in the interim rules.58 Most of the
additional provisions extend and clarify previous versions of the vague
interim rules.59 There are some pronounced differences, however.60 Some
of the revised rules are likely to smooth the way for foreign investors who

50
Emad Mekay, China Oil Bid Tests US Free Market Rhetoric, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 15, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GG15Ad01.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) (citing a poll stating that
73% of those polled disapproved of the prospective merger).
51
See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, China Tells Congress to Back off Businesses, WASH. POST FOREIGN
SERVICE,
July
5,
2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/04/AR2005070400551.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
52
Ben White & Justin Blum, Chinese Consider Assurances to Unocal, WASH. POST, July 14, 2005,
at D3.
53
Id. (Reasoning that “China's purchase of Unocal would dramatically increase its leverage over
critical players and key U.S. allies in the global war on terror and therefore its leverage over U.S. interests
in those regions.”).
54
H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005).
55
CNOOC Withdrawal Clears Way for Chevron Merger, EAST BAY BUS. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005,
http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2005/08/01/daily11.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
56
Justin Blum, Shareholders Vote in Favor Of Unocal Acquisition., WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2005 at
D1.
57
See Deas, supra note 11, at 1802-03.
58
Compare 2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9 (providing more detailed rules for the regulation of
foreign investment), with Interim Regulations, supra note 31 (providing only a basic outline for the
regulation of foreign investment).
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT: CHINA AMENDS FOREIGN M&A REGULATIONS 1
(2006), http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/CDDDA47C-B52E-40AC-9325-95DB28803733/40679/
ChinaAlertMASep061.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). (“The key changes introduced by the Acquisition
Regulations relate to the reporting procedures to, and approval by, MOFCOM.”).
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would otherwise be unable to acquire ownership in Chinese companies.61
However, other articles, such as Article 12, which provides an opaque
blueprint for national security review of foreign investments, have caused a
great deal of concern among foreign investors.62
B.

The Statutes and Regulations Providing for National Security Review
of Foreign Investment in the United States Have Been Adjusted Over
Time to Provide Balance Between Security and Efficiency of Review

In comparison to the relatively new and as yet undefined system for
national security review under Article 12, the United States’ CFIUS
procedures are relatively clear, largely as a result of constant tweaking
throughout the last 35 years. The original grant of authority to the President
to review and regulate foreign investment has been altered due to changing
national security and foreign investment needs. This tweaking has left the
United States with a system for reviewing foreign investment that strikes a
balance between encouraging investment and protecting national security.
1.

The United States Has Historically Regulated Foreign Investment as a
Means of Addressing National Security Concerns

The modern era of regulation of foreign direct investment in the
United States began in the 1970s when Congress began investigating the
large inflow of foreign direct investment.63 As a result of these
investigations, Congress passed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974
and the International Investment Survey Act of 1976.64 These Acts allowed
the President to collect information on international investment and provide
information to Congress.65 Governmental investigation under the Foreign
Investment Study Act of 1974 led Congress to conclude that “the United

61
See, e.g., 2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9, arts. 27-29 (allowing acquisitions of domestic
enterprises by foreign investors through the “payment of equity interests”). Before these rules, this method
of payment was not allowed. See Interim Regulations, supra note 31 (not allowing the use of equity
interests as a form of payment in an acquisition).
62
See, e.g., BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 60, at 1. (“[T]hese new provisions have sparked
concerns among foreign investors that future acquisitions will be subject to much tighter control and further
scrutiny by the Chinese government.”).
63
See SARA L. GORDON & FRANCIS A. LEES, FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 230-31 (1986).
64
Id. at 231.
65
Id. Congress, under the Defense Production Act of 1950, originally granted the power to the
President to investigate and monitor industries that could fill a role in the national defense of the United
States. Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2161-70 (1950).
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States lacked a coherent mechanism to monitor foreign investment.”66
President Ford decided that there was a “responsibility within the Executive
Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United
States . . . and for coordinating the implementation of the United States
policy on such investment” and delegated that responsibility to CFIUS.67
But the United States quickly determined that these laws alone were
not enough. Over the next thirty years, additional laws were passed which
today regulate national security review of foreign investment. These include
the Exon-Florio Amendment, the Byrd Amendment, and the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”).
2.

The Exon-Florio Amendment

During the 1980s, increased foreign direct investment heightened
public concerns that some foreign firms’ acquisitions of, and mergers with,
U.S. businesses might be undermining national security.68 Complaints
escalated in 1987 when Fujitsu, a Japanese electronics company, proposed to
acquire Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation.69 Fairchild was widely seen
as the “mother company” of Silicon Valley, and many viewed the
semiconductor industry as critical to the development of high-technology
weaponry.70 In addition, some observers argued that permitting Fujitsu to
acquire Fairchild would further encourage anticompetitive practices by
Japanese businesses and foster U.S. dependence on Japanese suppliers in the
dual-use technology market.71 Congressional committees held hearings on
whether and how the U.S. government should block the Fujitsu/Fairchild
transaction.72 Members of Congress concluded that additional statutory
authority was needed to authorize the blocking of foreign direct investment73
and proposed the Foreign Investment, National Security, and Essential
Commerce Amendment (“Exon-Florio Amendment”) to the Technology

66
Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or
a Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 589 (2007).
67
Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1975).
68
Alvarez, supra note 43, at 56- 63
69
Id. at 57.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 58.
72
See, e.g. Acquisitions by Foreign Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987) (statement of Commerce
Secretary Baldridge) [hereinafter June 10, 1987 Hearings].
73
ABA Section of International Law Report on Exon-Florio Amendments 2007,
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/IC752000/newsletterpubs/Section%27sReportwithRec
ommendationsonExon-FlorioProcess.doc (last visited October 29, 2009) [hereinafter ABA Report].
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Competitiveness Act.74 The original Exon-Florio Amendment would have
authorized the President to disrupt any foreign takeover, merger, acquisition,
joint venture or licensing agreement that threatened either the U.S. national
security or “essential commerce.”75
This proposal encountered strong opposition among many members of
Congress who were concerned that the inclusion of the “essential
commerce” language would chill foreign investment to the detriment of the
U.S. economy and invite retaliation against U.S. investors abroad.76 As a
result, the Senate Commerce Committee proposed to limit the “essential
commerce” criterion to “essential commerce which affects national
security.”77 However, this improvement was deemed inadequate and after
much debate, the legislation was adopted without any reference to “essential
commerce.”78
Furthermore, the 1988 Trade Act Conference Report specified that
Congress expected the Exon-Florio Amendment to be implemented in a
manner consistent with U.S. international obligations, which include many
open-investment commitments.79 Congress made clear that it expected that
the Exon-Florio Amendment would not be used as a protectionist tool to
block international competition.80 The revised provision was adopted with
the rest of the 1988 Trade Act on August 23, 1988, as an amendment to the
Defense Production Act.81
3.

The Byrd Amendment

In response to perceived threats to national security, the Exon-Florio
Amendment has undergone major reforms in an attempt to clarify CFIUS
74

Id.
Id.
76
Alvarez, supra note 43, at 63. See June 10, 1987 Hearings, supra note 72, at 65-76. Senator Exon
recognized this concern and stated in his initial proposal that he “in no way intended to ‘chill’ foreign
investment.” Alvarez, supra note 43, at 63. Thus, from its inception, the Exon-Florio Amendment was
characterized as not intended to block foreign investment, but rather to provide the authority needed in
extraordinary circumstances to protect national security. The debate over the Exon-Florio Amendment’s
“essential commerce” provision further illustrates the strong sentiment against impeding foreign investment
on economic grounds. On behalf of the Reagan Administration, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige
opposed consideration of any factors not directly related to national security, including the “essential
commerce” provision. June 10, 1987 Hearings, supra note 72. Other opponents of the original proposal
echoed these views. Id.
77
S. Rep. No. 100-80, at 25 (1987).
78
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170.
79
H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 523 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1556, 1988 WL
170253. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Regarding the Guaranty of
Investments, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 8, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 791.
80
H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 523 (1988).
81
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170.
75
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procedures.82 In 1993, Congress amended the Exon-Florio Amendment
through part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993,
commonly known as the Byrd Amendment.83 The Amendment created a
mandatory review of any foreign company that was “controlled by or acting
on behalf of a foreign government” and seeking to merge or take over a U.S.
company.84 Before the Byrd Amendment, all CFIUS reviews were
discretionary.85 By making review obligatory in certain cases, the Byrd
Amendment enhanced scrutiny of acquisition by businesses owned by
foreign governments.86
4.

The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”)

Congress passed FINSA87 in direct response to Dubai Ports World's
(“DP World”) attempt to acquire operations of American ports.88 The Dubai
Ports scandal occurred in February 2006, when DP World attempted to
purchase Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (“P&O”), a
British company that operated five U.S. ports.89 DP World is a company
owned in large part by the government of the United Arab Emirates
(“UAE”) through a holding company.90 DP World voluntarily approached
CFIUS about a review to approve the buyout.91 CFIUS signed off within
thirty days, as opposed to the forty-five day period required by the Byrd
Amendment for foreign-government-owned businesses.92
When the story first broke, the American public and many members of
Congress were openly critical of what they considered a “rubber-stamping”
by CFIUS.93 “This transaction apparently did not come to the attention of
Congress until after it had been approved by CFIUS, prompting a wave of
protests by U.S. politicians . . . .”94 Critics believed DP World created a
82

See Mostaghel, supra note 66, at 591-603.
Id. at 600-01.
84
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(b).
85
Mostaghel, supra note 66, at 601-03.
86
Id. at 603.
87
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007)
(amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170).
88
Cox, supra note 45, at 300.
89
EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., US NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 139 (2006), at 139.
90
Mostaghel, supra note 66, at 606-07.
91
Id. at 606.
92
Id.
93
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 89, at 136-39.
94
ABA Report, supra note 73, at 10. The politicians speaking out against the proposed merger
included “Robert Ehrlich, the Republican governor of Maryland and Jon Corzine, his Democratic peer in
New Jersey; Charles Schumer and Hillary Clinton, democratic senators of New York; Pete King, the
83
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national security risk because of “the UAE's history as an operational and
financial base for the hijackers who carried out the attacks of Sept[ember]
11, 2001.”95 Amid backlash from Congress and the American public, DP
World voluntarily divested its ownership in P&O.96 Congress responded by
approving FINSA,97 created by Senators Chris Dodd and Richard Shelby to
“overhaul how the government reviews foreign takeovers of U.S.
companies.”98
Signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 26, 2007,99
FINSA purports to clarify the scope of national security review in the ExonFlorio Amendment.100 It also enhances the reporting requirements for
CFIUS by adding to the transparency of CFIUS reviews.101 On December
22, 2008, a new set of regulations seeking to clarify and improve the CFIUS
review process also went into effect (“CFIUS regulations”).102 In drafting
FINSA and the new regulations a number of proposals to insert the type of
“essential commerce” language originally included in Senator Exon’s
amendment were rejected.103 Thus, over the years, Congress and various
administrations have succeeded in resisting efforts to make CFIUS review a
tool for economic protectionism, while still allowing for the legislative
changes that leave FINSA in its current regulatory state. This history of
specific statutory and regulatory controls on the powers of CFIUS is in
Republican chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee; and Bill Frist, the Senate majority
leader.” Id.
95
Sean Alfano, Dems. Attack Port Takeover By Arabs, CBS NEWS, Feb. 20, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/19/national/main1330431.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
96
Shakir Husain, DP World Completes P&O Unit Sale to AIG, GULFNEWS, Mar. 17, 2007,
http://archive.gulfnews.com/indepth/pando/more_stories/10111732.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). DP
World sold its complete ownership in P&O to the American company AIG Global Investment Group.
97
Foreign Investment and National Security Act 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007)
(amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170).
98
Peter Kaplan, Senators Plan New Bill on Foreign Takeover Reviews, REUTERS, May 10, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN1028906020070510 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
99
Memorandum from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, President Bush Signs ExonFlorio Reform Legislation, 1 (July 31, 2007) http://www.paulweiss.com/files/Publication/f17d8d40-43ba4ac2-9f0e-0188c4f05605/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c04e8271-9fb6-4ca9-98860860a397771e/31Jul07Memo.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
100
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons; Final Rule,
73 Fed. Reg. 226, 70702 (Dep’t of the Treasury Nov. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/CFIUS-Final-Regulations-new.pdf.
101
Id.
102
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 31 C.F.R. §
800.210 (2008).
103
E.g., compare, H.R. 4881, 109th Cong. § 2(d)(3) (2005), at § 2(d)(3) (proposing a definition of
“Critical Infrastructure” that included a “system or asset. . . vital to . . . national economic security. . . .”)
(emphasis added), with, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a)(67) (defining “Critical Infrastructure” as “systems and
assets. . . vital to . . . national security”), and, 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 (both defining “Critical Infrastructure”
as a “systems and or assets. . . vital to . . . national security.”).
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contrast to Article Twelve, which provides few details or controls on its
implementation.
III.

CHINA’S VERSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW IS OVERBROAD AND
VAGUELY DEFINED, AND COULD DETER FUTURE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND NEGATIVELY AFFECT EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE REVIEW

Article Twelve of the 2006 M&A Provisions provides little guidance
on the nature of China’s national security review for either Chinese
authorities charged with the task or foreign investors considering an
acquisition. Article Twelve allows the Ministry of Commerce to conduct a
review of any investment that results in actual foreign investor control over
an enterprise that: 1) “involves [a] major industry,” 2) “has or may have …
influence on … state security,” 3) involves a “famous [Chinese] trademark,”
or 4) is a business with a “name of long history . . . .”104 This system for
national security review of foreign investment is underdeveloped to the point
of creating uncertainties for foreign investors and governmental authorities
alike. Article Twelve is also flawed in that it fails to provide procedural
safeguards. Specifically, Article Twelve fails to: 1) define which
transactions are subject to national security review, 2) provide the procedural
requirements and criteria for national review, and 3) provide protections to
parties after the approval and completion of a transaction.
A.

The 2006 M&A Provisions Fail to Define Which Transactions Are
Subject to National Security Review

The lack of specificity in defining which transactions are covered by
Article Twelve makes it difficult to predict which transactions will be
subjected to review, and on what basis. Depending on the interpretation of
terms like “national security,” “state security,” “major industry,” and
“famous trademark or having a name of long history” either a small sector of
the Chinese economy or practically its entirety could be subject to the
mandatory reporting requirements of Article Twelve. While “state security”
and “national security” are undefined in Article Twelve, there is some
evidence that Chinese authorities intend to read them quite broadly.105 For
104

2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9, art. 12.
See, e.g., Thomas R. Howell et al., China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: A Perspective from the
United States, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 53, 92 (2008) (discussing plans to use the national security
provisions contained in the M&A Rules and the Anti-Monopoly Law to protect the Chinese soy bean
industry from foreign investment). China has heightened these fears of protectionist use of merger review
by rejecting the proposed merger between Coca-Cola and China Huiyuan Juice Group. Michael Orey,
M&A: Behind the Heat on Global Deals, BUS. WEEK, April 6, 2009, at 73. The move was characterized by
105
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example, China has recently delayed or rejected investments in a cookware
company,106 a paper producer,107 retailers, soybean producers, automakers,
cement producers, and steel manufacturers108 for “national security” reasons.
The lack of definitions of key terms in Article Twelve contributes to fears
that China’s national security review will be applied broadly and used in a
protectionist manner.
Additionally, Article Twelve restricts the Ministry of Commerce’s
authority to review investments that would grant a foreign entity the “right
to control,”109 but “right to control” is not defined. Whether “the right to
control” extends only to majority shareholders and dominant minority
shareholders or to any stakeholder is unknown. Given the vast number of
ways in which an investor can gain even some miniscule degree of control
over business entities, the phrase “control,” as left undefined by Article
Twelve, is extremely ambiguous. This leaves open the possibility that
investment by silent minority shareholders or contractual partners, who may
exercise some limited degree of influence on limited matters, may be
subjected to advanced “national security” screening. Such a potential
screening requirement would unreasonably force stakeholders in Chinese
enterprises to examine nearly every transaction that the enterprise might
make for as-yet-undefined “national security” concerns, as even minor
contractual obligations could trigger the control provision of Article Twelve.
B.

The 2006 M&A Provisions Fail to Provide Procedural Requirements
and Criteria for National Security Review

A second major defect of Article Twelve is its failure to specify the
contents of reports that must be submitted to the Ministry of Commerce.
Article Twelve states that:
If a foreign investor merges or acquires a domestic enterprise
and obtains the actual right to control it, and it involves major
industry, has or may have the influence on the state security or
caused the transference of the actual right of the domestic
George L. Paul, an antitrust lawyer of the law firm White & Case, as “nothing less than a frontal assault on
foreign investment disguised as merger review . . . .” Id.
106
Keith Bradsher, China Casts Wary Eye on Foreign Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/business/worldbusiness/27iht-monopoly.4.7275218.html?_r=1 (last
visited Nov. 17, 2009).
107
Eileen Francis Schneider, Note, Be Careful What You Wish For: China's Protectionist Regulations
of Foreign Direct Investment Implemented in the Months Before Completing WTO Accession, 2 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 267, 270 (2007).
108
Id. at 274.
109
2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9, art. 12
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enterprise owning famous trademark or having a name of long
history, the person concerned shall submit a report on it to the
Ministry of Commerce.110
If the parties to the transaction fail to submit what the Ministry of Commerce
feels is an adequate report and the Ministry of Commerce determines that
the “merger or acquisition does cause or may cause serious influence on the
state economic security,” the Ministry of Commerce and other departments
may stop the proposed transaction or, if the transaction has already occurred,
force a divestment of ownership and assets.111
Article Twelve also grants the Ministry of Commerce blanket
authority to take any other measures necessary “to eliminate the influence of
the merger or acquisition on the state security.”112 The mandatory reporting
language of Article Twelve113 and the seriousness with which China enforces
its foreign investment rules114 may draw transactions that would normally be
considered far afield of “national security” concerns into Article Twelve
review. This is especially true when viewed in combination with the vague
language about what constitutes a transaction covered by Article Twelve.115
Given the fact that underreporting can cause the Ministry of Commerce and
other affiliated agencies to take the drastic and damaging step of forcing a
divestment, parties are likely to over-report, which wastes the time and
energy of the party submitting the report, and burdens the administrative
body charged with reviewing it.
The 2006 M&A Provisions provide no timelines for national security
reviews. Obviously, having a timeline to plan around is important for parties
to review transactions. Predictability of the regulatory process influences
where investors decide to invest their capital and valuation of assets.116 The
addition of timelines “helps to speed up the review process of the law
enforcement authorities, increases review efficiency, lowers law
enforcement costs to a certain extent, and protects the interests of the
110

2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9, art. 12 (emphasis added).
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Steve Dickinson, Foreign Direct Investment In China: It All Just Changed, CHINA LAW BLOG,
March 6, 2008, http://www.chinalawblog.com/2008/03/foreign_direct_investment_in_c.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009).
115
See 2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9, art. 12.
116
See Alvarez, supra note 43, at 80. During the immediate aftermath of the establishment of
CFIUS, investors “started cutting the price tags of companies whose sale to foreign bidders could raise a
national security question.” Id. Defense firms, particularly, struggled to find investors, despite the fact that
such firms were being undervalued by up to 25 %. Id. at 80 n.434.
111
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parties . . . .”117 Unfortunately, Article Twelve fails to provide timelines that
would yield these advantages. This is of particular concern when investors
consider that, in the past, Chinese authorities have allowed review of
transactions to stretch on for years.118
The 2006 M&A Provisions are also silent as to what factors will be
considered when conducting a “state security” or “national security” review.
There is value both to parties and to governmental actors in “putting policy
on the record [which] . . . temper[s] the arbitrary character of approvals and
disapprovals and preclude[s] . . . stalemates over technicalities.”119 When
this ambiguity is combined with the lack of a definition of the terms “state
security” and “national security” and the lack of any guidance on what
should be contained in the “national security report,” the Article Twelve
review process becomes a guessing game for the parties involved.
C.

The 2006 M&A Provisions Fail to Provide Protection to Parties to
Previously Approved Transactions

Finally, the 2006 M&A Provisions do not contain a “safe harbor”
provision for approved transactions. Under Article Twelve, the Ministry of
Commerce is not prohibited from reopening previously approved
transactions, without cause. The failure to provide a “safe harbor” provision
causes additional uncertainty to foreign investors and may dissuade them
from pursuing national security related transactions even if the transactions
are initially approved by the Ministry of Commerce. Even if China is
concerned about having the chance to later review transactions that may
have been approved based upon fraud or misrepresentation, a presumptive
“safe harbor” absent such a showing would reassure investors and serve
governmental purposes. For these reasons the national security review
provided for by the 2006 M&A Provisions leaves much to be desired, and
should be amended.

117

Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 73, 91 (2008).
See, e.g., supra Part II.A.2. (discussing the quashed takeover of XCMG by the Carlyle Group).
119
DANIEL H. ROSEN, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., BEHIND THE OPEN DOOR: FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN THE
CHINESE MARKETPLACE 23 (1999).
118
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ARTICLE TWELVE OF THE 2006 M&A PROVISIONS SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO PROVIDE MORE TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY TO
NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW

The lack of clarity in Article Twelve may have the unintended
consequence of discouraging beneficial foreign direct investment in China.
“[U]ncertainty about the rule's content can cause individuals to protect
themselves by overcomplying, that is, foregoing behavior in which they
have a right to engage.”120 Here, the discouraged behavior is investing in
China.
Withholding approval from foreign acquisitions without standards for
doing so, and the uncertainty that follows, has resulted in a decline in foreign
investment in China in the past.121 Between January and August 2006,
after beginning to apply increased scrutiny to foreign investments without a
regulatory structure in place, China experienced a 2.1% decrease in foreign
investment compared to the same months in 2005, and the pace continued to
slow as the 2006 M&A Regulations were announced.122 Indeed, in August
2006 China received 8.5% less foreign investment than August 2005.123
China can solve a number of the problems posed by the lack of clarity
in Article Twelve by revising it to remove ambiguity in ways that reflect the
advantages of the U.S. review process, which, while imposing somewhat
flexible “standards” instead of hard and fast “rules,”124 provides guidance
to both foreign investors and regulators. These include: 1) defining the
terms “national security,” “state security,” and “major industry;” 2) defining
“famous trademark or having a name of long history;” 3) clarifying “right to
control;” 4) creating additional procedural guidelines; 5) creating timetables
for action or inaction by the Ministry of Commerce; and 6) creating a “safe
harbor” guarantee.

120

Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in
the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 544 (1994).
121
Clay Chandler, China Takes a Break, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2006, at 37.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
For examinations of the difference between rules and standards, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 71-79 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571-86 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social
Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 107-16 (1997).
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China Should Define “National Security,” “State Security,” and
“Major Industry,” To Remove Ambiguity as to Which Transactions
Are Subject to National Security Review

Defining the terms “national security,” “state security,” and “major
industry,” and supplying factors for the Ministry of Commerce to apply in
conducting national security reviews would go a long way in assuaging fears
that Article Twelve will be used as a protectionist tool. In addition, these
changes would streamline review of transactions and help ensure a greater
degree of predictability and uniformity in the outcome of the reviews.
China should look to the CFIUS regulations125 in crafting the factors
to be considered in determining whether a transaction is covered under
Article Twelve’s definitions of “national security,” “state security,” and
“major industry.”126 The CFIUS regulations list eleven factors and
numerous sub-factors to be considered by CFIUS and the President when
reviewing the national security implications of foreign investments.127
125

See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170.
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(f).
127
Id. The full list of factors to be considered is “(1) domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements, (2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national
defense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials, and
other supplies and services, (3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national
security, (4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of military goods,
equipment, or technology to any country-- (A) identified by the Secretary of State-- (i) under section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 [section 2405(j) of this Appendix], as a country that supports
terrorism; (ii) under section 6(l) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [section 2405(l) of this
Appendix], as a country of concern regarding missile proliferation; or (iii) under section 6(m) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 [section 2405(m) of this Appendix], as a country of concern regarding the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons; (B) identified by the Secretary of Defense as posing a
potential regional military threat to the interests of the United States; or (C) listed under section 309(c) of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 on the ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country List’ (15
C.F.R. Part 778, Supplement No. 4) or any successor list; (5) the potential effects of the proposed or
pending transaction on United States international technological leadership in areas affecting United States
national security; (6) the potential national security-related effects on United States critical infrastructure,
including major energy assets; (7) the potential national security-related effects on United States critical
technologies; (8) whether the covered transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction, as
determined under subsection (b)(1)(B) of this section; (9) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to
transactions requiring an investigation under subsection (b)(1)(B) of this section, a review of the current
assessment of-- (A) the adherence of the subject country to nonproliferation control regimes, including
treaties and multilateral supply guidelines, which shall draw on, but not be limited to, the annual report on
‘Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments’ required by section 2593a of Title 22; (B) the relationship of such country with the United
States, specifically on its record on cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, which shall draw on, but not be
limited to, the report of the President to Congress under section 7120 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; and (C) the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with
military applications, including an analysis of national export control laws and regulations; (10) the longterm projection of United States requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and
126
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These factors include domestic production needs,128 effects on critical
infrastructure,129 and long term material and energy needs.130 However, the
Chinese version need not be as exhaustive. A short list of five or six
important factors would provide guidance to foreign investors, both when
considering investments and preparing for review.
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law provides six factors to be considered
during anti-competition review, including a catchall factor allowing for
flexibility.131 The listed factors are:
1. The involved business operators’ market share in the relevant
market and their controlling power over that market; 2. The
degree of market concentration in the relevant market; 3. The
impact of the concentration of business operators on the market
access and technological advancements; 4. The impact of the
concentration of business operators on the consumers and other
business operators; 5. The impact of the concentration of
business operators on the national economic development; and
6. Other factors that may affect the market competition and
shall be considered as deemed by the Anti-monopoly Law
Enforcement Agency under the State Council.132
This list could also serve as a model for China in crafting its factors for
national security review.
B.

China Should Publicize What Constitutes a “Famous Trademark or
Having a Name of Long History”

In defining “famous trademark or having a name of long history,”
China should seek to publicize as much information about which brands are
covered as possible. Currently, “famous trademarks” can be certified by a
People’s Court and Chinese administrative agencies.133 But, because
People’s Court certifications are not listed publicly, it is difficult for foreign
material; and (11) such other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be appropriate,
generally or in connection with a specific review or investigation.”
128
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(f)(1).
129
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(f)(6).
130
50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(f)(10).
131
Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 27, LAWINFOCHINA (P.R.C.) (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) [hereinafter AntiMonopoly Law].
132
Id.
133
OECD, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S POLICIES TOWARDS CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 3 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/26/37808943.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
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investors to ascertain if a trademark qualifies as a “famous trademark.”134
Publication of People’s Court certifications, along with the creation of a
central database of “famous trademarks and brands,” would allow investors
to make informed decisions as to which brands would be subject to
increased national security scrutiny.
C.

China Should Create a Statutory Definition of “Right to Control” to
Provide Clarity to Both Investors and Regulators

China should also clarify what it means by the “right to control” a
Chinese entity. The CFIUS regulations provide a detailed definition of what
constitutes a foreign interest exercising control over a domestic entity135 and
offer a good blueprint for China’s statutory definition. According to the
CFIUS regulations:
The term control means the power, direct or indirect, whether or
not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a
dominant minority of the total outstanding voting interest in an
entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share,
contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to
act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide
important matters affecting an entity . . . .136
“Important matters” include the sale and lease of principle assets,137
reorganization, merger, or dissolution,138 entry into or termination of
significant contracts,139 appointment or dismissal of officers and senior
managers140 or employees with access to sensitive or classified
information,141 and selection of new ventures142 and major expenditures.143
In addition, only certain types of transactions are defined as conferring
control and subject to CFIUS review. These transactions include:
[A] proposed or completed merger, acquisition or
takeover . . . includ[ing] . . . (a) The acquisition of an ownership
134

Id.
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 31 C.F.R. §
800.204 (2008).
136
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a).
137
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(1).
138
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(2).
139
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(6).
140
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(8).
141
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(9).
142
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(5).
143
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a)(4).
135
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interest in an entity. (b) The acquisition or conversion of
convertible voting instruments of an entity. (c) The acquisition
of proxies from holders of a voting interest in an entity. (d) A
merger or consolidation. (e) The formation of a joint venture.
(f) A long-term lease under which a lessee makes substantially
all business decisions concerning the operation of a leased
entity, as if it were the owner.144
The CFIUS regulations also provide a list of examples of covered
transactions145 and non-covered transactions.146
Using the CFIUS definition of control being the “power . . . to
determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity . . .”147 and
providing a list of what constitutes important matters148 would help
businesses and the Ministry of Commerce make principled decisions as to
which deals confer control to foreign interests.149
D.

China Should Provide Additional Procedural Guidelines to Protect
Investors and Promote Foreign Investment in China

In addition to these clarifications of important statutory terms, the
creation of additional procedural guidelines would help ensure both
efficiency and efficacy of review. The creation of guidelines that govern
what must be included in the national security reports mandated by Article
12 would help ensure that parties provide the Ministry of Commerce with
the necessary information to conduct a full national security review without
144

31 C.F.R. § 800.224; see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.204
31 C.F.R. § 800.301. E.g. “Corporation A, a foreign person, proposes to purchase all of the shares
of Corporation X, which is a U.S. business. As the sole owner, Corporation A will have the right to elect
directors and appoint other primary officers of Corporation X, and those directors will have the right to
make decisions about the closing and relocation of particular production facilities and the termination of
significant contracts. The directors also will have the right to propose to Corporation A, the sole
shareholder, the dissolution of Corporation X and the sale of its principal assets. The proposed transaction
is a covered transaction.” Id.
146
31 C.F.R. § 800.302. E.g. “Corporation A, a foreign person, holds 10,000 shares of Corporation B,
a U.S. business, constituting ten percent of the stock of Corporation B. Corporation B pays a 2-for-1 stock
dividend. As a result of this stock split, Corporation A holds 20,000 shares of Corporation B, still
constituting ten percent of the stock of Corporation B. Assuming no other relevant facts, the acquisition of
additional shares is not a covered transaction.” Id.
147
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a).
148
Id.
149
Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 131, arts. 20, 22. Articles 20 and 22 of China’s Anti-Monopoly
Law could also be a good model from which to start crafting a definition of “control.” These articles
generally provide which transactions need to be reviewed, art. 20, and which ones do may not, art. 22. The
use of such phrases as “cap[ability] to of exercising decisive influence,” would help ensure that small,
silent- minority shareholders and minor contractual relationships would not subject foreign investment to
national security review. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 131, art. 20(3).
145
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bombarding it with extraneous documents. It would also prevent companies
from having to submit repeated filings to satisfy the Ministry of Commerce’s
requests.
The CFIUS regulations contain lists of required documents and would
be a good blueprint for required documents under China’s national security
review.150 The list mandates a description of (1) the transaction in question,
including its essential elements, nature, parties, and expected date of
closing;151 (2) the assets being acquired;152 (3) the business activities,
locations, government contracts, classified governmental contracts, and
defense-related or defense-applicable technological assets of the business
being acquired;153 (4) the business activities of the foreign business,
especially its plans for the acquired business or assets;154 and (5) whether the
foreign business is acting on behalf of or is controlled by a foreign
government.155 Articles 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the 2006 M&A Provisions also
provide detailed instructions about what is required to be submitted during
the normal foreign investment review process,156 and Articles 32, 42 and 44
provide what additional information must be provided if the transaction
meets certain other requirements.157 These provisions could also serve as a
guide in crafting the documentary requirements for Article 12 review.
E.

China Should Create a Timeline to Avoid Unreasonable Delays in the
National Security Review Process

Additionally, China should create timetables for either action or
inaction by the Ministry of Commerce to ensure predictable and timely
execution of national security reviews. Carefully crafted timelines would
speed review of transactions and protect parties, while allowing extended
review of questionable investments.
China should look to the other procedures contained in the 2006 M&A
Provisions, and the CFIUS regulations for guidance in crafting its review
timelines. For example, Article 25 of the 2006 M&A Provisions provides a
150
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of the parties, the transaction, plans for the acquired assets, and plans for the settlement of current
employees.
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2006 M&A Provisions, supra note 9, arts. 32, 42, 44. These Articles relate mainly to equity
transactions and mandate additional reporting requirements and an additional M&A consultant report
concerning equity pricing.
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thirty-day period in which “the examination and approval organ
shall . . . make a decision of approval or disapproval.”158 Additionally,
Exon-Florio and the associated Treasury regulations provide even more
detailed timelines for national security review. After formally accepting a
transaction for review, CFIUS has 30 days to complete its initial review.159
After acceptance of a transaction for review, the Director of National
Intelligence is required to provide “a thorough analysis of any threat to the
national security of the United States posed by any covered transaction”160
within twenty days.161 A 45-day investigation of the transaction begins if
CFIUS determines that:
[I] the transaction threatens to impair the national security of
the United States and the threat has not been mitigated during
or prior to the review . . .; [II] the transaction is a foreign
government-controlled transaction; or [III] the transaction
would result in control of any critical infrastructure of or within
the United States by or on the behalf of any foreign person, if
the Committee determines that the transaction could impair
national security . . . . 162
This investigation can also be triggered if “the lead agency recommends, and
the Committee concurs, that an investigation be undertaken.”163
During the investigation CFIUS must examine “the effects of a
covered transaction on the national security of the United States, and take
any necessary actions in connection with the transaction to protect the
national security of the United States.”164 An investigation concludes with
CFIUS taking one of four actions: (1) dismissing the investigation; (2)
drafting a mitigation agreement with the parties of the covered transaction to
alleviate the threat to national security; (3) allowing the parties to the
covered transaction to withdraw and resubmit; or (4) submitting the findings
of the investigation to the President to make a decision as to whether or not
to allow the transaction.165 If CFIUS submits its findings to the President,
he or she has fifteen days166 to decide if it is “appropriate to suspend or
prohibit [the] covered transaction [because it] threatens to impair the
158
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national security of the United States.”167 Under the three statutorily
defined deadlines of the Exon-Florio Amendment, a transaction can be
prohibited, at most, ninety days after CFIUS formally accepts it for
review.168
If Article 12 were amended to provide a similar timeline, the 90-day
total period provided would give flexibility to tailor the length of review to
varying national security concerns and would still provide the possibility of
finality for what has sometimes been an unnecessarily long screening
process resulting in delayed or abandoned beneficial investment.169
F.

China Should Create a “Safe Harbor” Provision to Ensure Finality in
National Security Review Decisions

Finally, China should create a “safe harbor” guarantee. This
guarantee would preclude reexamination of transactions that have been
approved by the Ministry of Commerce, absent proof of false, misleading, or
incomplete submission by the parties.
The CFIUS provisions provide that once a transaction has been
approved by CFIUS or the President, that transaction cannot be reexamined,
except under narrow circumstances. Unless a “party to the transaction
submitted false or misleading material information to the Committee in
connection with the review or investigation or omitted material information,
including material documents, from information submitted to the
Committee . . .” 170 or a party materially breaches a mitigation agreement171
the decision of CFIUS or the President cannot be reopened. This provision
provides an incentive to parties to voluntarily submit covered transactions to
CFIUS for review and protects parties from the costly remedy of divestment.
This “safe harbor” provision of the CFIUS regulations is one of its most
important qualities.172
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Adding a “safe harbor” provision to assure parties that Ministry of
Commerce approval allows them to confidently pursue their transaction,
without fear of a future forced divestment, lends confidence to the review
process, and by extension encourages foreign investment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of China’s economic liberalization in 1978,
foreign direct investment in China has acted as a driving force behind some
of China’s most positive transformations. Foreign investment has helped
grow the Chinese economy at a staggering pace and shift hundreds of
millions of Chinese citizens from subsistence living to the middle class. One
of the most recent steps to liberalize foreign investment was the introduction
of the 2006 M&A Provisions. While, overall, this law was a great stride
forward in clarifying the review process for foreign investments, the
provisions relating to national security review of foreign investments are
unclear.
Article 12 of the 2006 M&A Provisions grants the Ministry of
Commerce the authority to perform a national security review of proposed
foreign investments. This authority is similar to the authority of the CFIUS
to review proposed foreign investments in the United States. The authority
and procedures of the CFIUS are dictated by strict statutory and regulatory
guidelines. These guidelines provide a range of protections for investors and
help ensure efficient, effective, and timely review of proposed investments.
Unfortunately, Article 12 of China’s 2006 M&A Provisions fails to provide
such guidelines. The omission of these guidelines unnecessarily complicates
the review process and discourages foreign investment. To correct this
problem, China should amend Article 12 to include a definitive framework
for review and additional protections for foreign investors. In revising the
2006 M&A Provisions, China should look to the United States’ CFIUS
procedures and other sections of the 2006 M&A Provisions. Revising
Article 12 to include a clear review framework and express protections for
foreign investors would allow China to achieve the twin aims of encouraging
foreign investment and safeguarding its national security.

